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The streets steal stories. Crush the bodies of boys and girls with molars of
jagged concrete; tear at tender hearts with incisors of glass shards. I tried
to remember who we wanted to be. Where we came from before our names
shriveled under the labels of “at risk,” “street involved,” “runaways,”
“throwaways,” “trash.” The streets ingest lives. Bodies decompose in the
acidic reality of survival. We were swallowed by systems incapable of
digesting us.1
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Law course entitled Sexuality & the Law in Spring 2012. This article was written for a
CUNY School of Law course entitled Sexuality & the Law in Spring 2012. I am in-
debted to the clients and volunteers at M.C.C.N.Y. Sylvia’s Place for inspiring my jour-
ney to become a juvenile rights advocate. I am grateful to Ruthann Robson, Professor
of Law and University Distinguished Professor, for believing that the ideas of her stu-
dents ought to be shared beyond CUNY. I wish to thank the staff of this Law Review
for crafting and re-crafting this Note with me. Last but not least, I thank my mother
Elena, my father Konstantin, and my brother Gregory for their love and support—no
matter what.
1 Sassafras Lowrey, KICKED OUT (2010), http://www.kickedoutanthology.com/an-
thology/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
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INTRODUCTION
Colloquially, it is termed the “kicked out for coming out epi-
demic.” Youth are coming out to their parents as lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, transgender, or questioning (LGBTQ)2 at younger ages
than ever before.3 Some parents not only support their child but
are excited by this discovery of self. Others are uncomfortable at
first but grow tolerant and, eventually, affirming of their child’s
identity. But “the epidemic” is not referring to these scenarios.
There are parents that outright reject their child’s sexual orienta-
tion or gender non-conformity. Frightened, threatened, angered,
or disgusted by their child’s disclosure, some try to repair the child
through therapy.4 Others badger, belittle, or beat the youth.5 Fi-
nally, there are the vectors of “the epidemic.” There are parents
that turn the home into such an unbearably cruel place that the
child runs away; these parents present the choice: follow my rules
or go. Other parents simply demand the child to leave.
LGBTQ youth are disproportionately represented among un-
accompanied homeless youth.6 Homelessness can also be dispro-
2 I use the acronym LGBTQ throughout this paper to refer to lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender, and questioning youth. When a source has used an alternative acro-
nym or specific term, I have noted it. “Lesbian” refers to a woman or girl who has
enduring romantic, physical, and/or sexual attraction for other females. “Gay” refers
to a person who is romantically, physically, and sexually attracted to other people of
the same gender; it may be used to refer to men and boys specifically. “Bisexual”
refers to a person who is romantically, physically, and sexually attracted to people who
are male or female. “Transgender” is an umbrella term encompassing people whose
gender identity does not match their sex assigned at birth. The term includes people
who self-identify as transgender or are perceived to be transgender. “Questioning”
refers to a person who is exploring their sexual orientation and/or gender identity.
3 LGBT youth who worked with The Family Acceptance Project reported coming
out, on average, at age 13 and four months. See CAITLIN RYAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR CUL-
TURAL COMPETENCE, HELPING FAMILIES SUPPORT LGBT CHILDREN 1–2 (2009), available
at http://nccc.georgetown.edu/documents/LGBT_Brief.pdf. See also NICO SIFFRA
QUINTANA ET AL., CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, ON THE STREETS: THE FEDERAL RE-
SPONSE TO GAY AND TRANSGENDER HOMELESS YOUTH 8–9 (2010), available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/lgbtyouth
homelessness.pdf.
4 See generally Karolyn Ann Hicks, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental Attempts to
Change A Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
505, 513–19 (1999). For more personalized accounts of reparative therapy, see Tyler
Talbot, Comment, Reparative Therapy for Homosexual Teens: The Choice of the Teen Should
Be the Only Choice Discussed, 27 J. JUV. L. 33 (2006).
5 See generally Lowrey, supra note 1.
6 See NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL’Y INST. & NAT’L COAL.
FOR THE HOMELESS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF
HOMELESSNESS 162–66 (2006), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
HomelessYouth.pdf (providing a detailed list of estimates about the proportion of
LGBTQ youth within the homeless youth population, and noting that, although spe-
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portionately brutal for these youth. Not only do LGBTQ youth face
barriers to assistance that other youth encounter, such as a lack of
services and general distrust of adult service providers, but they are
also plagued with the risk of continuing rejection. Parents are not
the only entities that reject, and LGBTQ youth can resist services
when they perceive them as unsafe or discriminatory toward their
sexual orientation and/or gender expression.7 Hindered access to
services increases the difficulty of securing basic survival needs.
LGBTQ homeless youth advocates have advanced recommen-
dations to increase services and support for these youth.8 The rec-
ommendations include raising awareness among service providers
about the unique struggles LGBTQ youth face, transforming the
culture of homeless youth services to be safer for LGBTQ youth,
expanding LGBTQ specific services, and working with parents to
prevent rejection.9 These recommendations must be implemented.
Yet advocates must also take guidance from the creative youth they
serve and consider alternative options.
One unexplored option is the parental duty of financial sup-
port. In New York, parents must provide their children with shel-
ter, food, clothing, and other necessities until the child reaches 21
years of age or the parent-child relationship is legally terminated.10
Unaccompanied youth who have been rejected by their families
because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
cific research is minimal, estimates about transgender homeless youth are included in
general estimates). For a similar, more recent study that does not include transgender
identity, see Heather L. Corliss et al., High Burden of Homelessness Among Sexual-Minority
Adolescents: Findings From a Representative Massachusetts High School Sample, 101 AM. J. OF
PUB. HEALTH 1683 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3154237/pdf/1683.pdf (“Approximately 25% of lesbian and gay adolescents and
15% of bisexuals reported homelessness compared with just 3% of the exclusively
heterosexual adolescents.” Id. at 1686.).
7 See Laura A. Hughes, Homeless LGBT Youth: Living on the Streets at the Dangerous
Intersection of Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Race, and Class, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 12, 2012, 3:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-a-hughes/homeless-
lgbt-youth_b_1338509.html; RAY, supra note 6, at 5.
8 See N.Y.C. COMM’N ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUESTIONING
RUNAWAY AND HOMELESS YOUTH, ALL OUR CHILDREN: STRATEGIES TO PREVENT HOME-
LESSNESS, STRENGTHEN SERVICES, AND BUILD SUPPORT FOR LGBTQ YOUTH  31–42
(2010) [hereinafter N.Y.C. LGBTQ HOMELESS YOUTH REPORT], available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2010/pr267_10_report.pdf. This commission consists of
LGBTQ homeless youth service providers and government officials who make broad
policy recommendations and specific strategies to address LGBTQ youth homeless-
ness in New York City. See also LAMBDA LEGAL ET AL., NATIONAL RECOMMENDED BEST
PRACTICES FOR SERVING LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH (2009), available at http://www.f2f.ca.
gov/res/pdf/NationalRecommended.pdf.
9 See LAMBDA LEGAL ET AL., supra note 8.
10 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 2013).
366 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:363
identity, could enforce this duty against their parents. Court en-
forcement can provide youth with the financial resources to obtain
their basic needs. Additionally, enforcement could incentivize a
transformation in the parent-child relationship.
Section II of this paper discusses the unique challenges
LGBTQ youth face during episodes of homelessness.11 This section
emphasizes the difficulty youth face in securing their basic needs
because of hindered access to homeless and social services, as well
as a general lack of financial resources.12 Section III explains the
legal duty parents have to financially support their child, which
persists despite a breakdown in the parent-child relationship. This
section focuses specifically on New York law and analyzes the de-
fense of constructive emancipation which parents could raise to
avoid liability. Section IV explores what enforcement by LGBTQ
unaccompanied youth would look like and exposes the inapplica-
bility of constructive emancipation to these cases. Section V rebuts
the expected critiques, and maintains that this proposal is a sup-
plement to, rather than a replacement of, the already-existing
recommendations to improve services and supports for LGBTQ
unaccompanied youth.
I. KICKED OUT FOR COMING OUT
“No matter what estimates are used, it is accepted that homelessness
among youth is substantial and widespread throughout the nation.”13
New York State defines a homeless youth as a person younger
than 21 years of age who is in need of services and without shelter
where supervision and care are available.14 Unaccompanied youth
are those who are homeless on their own. Federal law defines
homeless youth as youth who are not in the physical custody of a
11 See cf. JAN MOORE, NAT’L CTR. FOR HOMELESS EDUC., UNACCOMPANIED AND HOME-
LESS YOUTH: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 1995–2005, at 8 (2005), available at http://center.
serve.org/nche/downloads/uy_lit_review.pdf (stating that more than 22% of youth
with foster care experience are homeless for one or more days after turning 18). This
article focuses on the initial adoptive or biological relationship, while recognizing that
a major subset of youth is leaving foster care and juvenile justice systems.
12 See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMELESS YOUTH: NCH FACT SHEET #13, at
1–2 (2007), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/youth.
pdf (summarizing that the causes of homelessness include three interrelated catego-
ries of family problems, economic problems, and residential instability).
13 MOORE, supra note 11, at 5.
14 Runaway and Homeless Youth Act of 1978, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §532-a(2) (McKin-
ney 2013).
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parent or guardian.15 This population encompasses runaway16 and
throwaway youth.17 In data collected from major cities, unaccom-
panied youth comprise approximately 1% of the sheltered home-
less population.18 However, this number only considers young
people ages 5 to 17.19 Youth ages 18 to 21 fall into the next age
range, 18 to 34, which constitutes approximately 25% of the home-
less population in major cities.20
Generating accurate statistics about youth homelessness is dif-
ficult. Federal, state, and local governments differ in their defini-
tions of homeless youth.21 Additionally, unaccompanied youth are
difficult to research. One surveyor of homeless youth research and
literature conducted between 1995 and 2005 found that accurate
estimates about this population are particularly difficult to make
because these youth are highly transient, distrust adults, and may
not be able to consent to a research study.22 Furthermore, re-
searchers often look at sheltered populations to quantify homeless-
ness, though youth do not utilize homeless services universally.23
Determining the precise numbers of unaccompanied LGBTQ
15 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2), (6)
(2012).
16 See Ira Colby, Runaway and Throwaway Youth: Time for Policy Changes and Public
Responsibility, J. OF APPLIED RES. ON CHILD.: Informing Pol’y for Child. at Risk 3 (2011),
available at http://digitalcommons.library.tmc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1025&context=childrenatrisk. The U.S. Department of Education defines “runaway
youth” as young people who have left the home without parental permission and stay
away overnight. See id. Traditional definitions of runaway problematically imply that
youth had a choice to stay or leave. See id.
17 Id. at 3 (citing the 1001 NISMART report’s definition of throwaway youth as
young people who are either told to leave home by a parent or other household adult,
or are away from home and prevented from returning, with no adequate alternative
care arranged for them and they stayed outside the household overnight). See also
Moore, supra note 11, at 3 (positing that a broader definition of throwaway youths
includes those who have been abandoned or deserted by their parents).
18 U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS-SODEXHO, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A STATUS
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES: A 23-CITY SURVEY 13–14
(2007), available at http://usmayors.org/hhsurvey2007/hhsurvey07.pdf.
19 Id. at 15.
20 Id.
21 PATRICIA JULIANELLE ET AL., NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY,
ALONE WITHOUT A HOME: A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING UNACCOMPA-
NIED YOUTH 3–16 (2003), available at http://www.maine.gov/education/homeless_
ed/documents/alonewithouthome.pdf (listing state definitions, if they exist, for home-
less and runaway youth). See also RAY, supra note 6, at 9 (“A number of different defini-
tions of ‘youth’ and ‘homeless’ are used by government agencies and . . . this type of
inconsistency makes it difficult to optimize service delivery or determine the level of
funds really needed to serve the population.”).
22 MOORE, supra note 11, at 6.
23 Id. (stating that there is over reliance on information from shelters and agencies
in research on homeless and unaccompanied youth).
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youth is an even more muddled task. Sexual orientation and gen-
der identity are inherently fluid, especially for adolescents.24 Not
all youth who practice same-sex sexual relations identify as lesbian,
gay, or bisexual, just as gender non-conformity is not indicative of a
transgender identity. These fluid aspects of identity make quanti-
fying “LGBTQ homeless youth” difficult to study.
The last federal count of runaway and throwaway youth was
done in 1999.25 The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention found that approximately 1.7 million youth under the
age of 18 had had a runaway or throwaway experience in 1999.26 A
2007 study found approximately 3,800 unaccompanied youth in
New York City.27 Though they comprise only an estimated 2% to
7% of the general youth population, between 20% and 40% of
homeless youth identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.28
These extraordinary numbers are on the rise.29
The causes of youth homelessness are as varied as the youth
themselves. Though some youth leave their homes by choice, many
do not.30 Economic problems, residential instability, and family
conflict—including physical and psychological abuse—account for
most episodes of homelessness among youth.31 These long-stand-
24 J. Lauren Turner, From the Inside Out: Calling on States to Provide Medically Necessary
Care to Transgender Youth in Foster Care, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 552, 553–54 (2009).
25 See HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PRO-
GRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NATIONAL INCIDENCE
STUDIES OF MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN (NISMART)
1–2 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/196469.pdf.
26 Id. at 5. This is a dated statistic. In 2010, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention initiated the NISMART-3 process to gather more recent statistics.
See Request for Proposals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP FY 2010 National Incidence
Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Thrownaway Children 3, OMB No. 1121-
0329 (2010), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/grants/solicitations/FY2010/NIS-
MART3.pdf. But cf. NAT’L RUNAWAY SWITCHBOARD, http://www.1800runaway.org/
(last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (estimating that between 1.6 and 2.8 million youth run
away annually in the United States).
27 LANCE FREEMAN & DARRICK HAMILTON, EMPIRE STATE COAL. FOR YOUTH & FAMILY
SERVS., A COUNT OF HOMELESS YOUTH IN NEW YORK CITY 7 (2008), available at http://
www.citylimits.org/images_pdfs/pdfs/HomelessYouth.pdf.
28 RAY, supra note 6, at 1. See also LAMBDA LEGAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 1 (estimat-
ing percentage of LGBT youth in the general population ranges between 4% and
10%).
29 RAY, supra note 6, at 12.
30 See Three Rules for Working with Unaccompanied Youth, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON
FAMILIES & YOUTH, http://ncfy.acf.hhs.gov/features/serving-youth-economic-down-
turn/three-rules-working-unaccompanied-youth (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). See also
RAY, supra note 6, at 16; Rosemarie Buchanan, Young, Homeless, and Gay, 22 HUM. RTS.
42, 49 (1995) (arguing that in connection with family rejection, LGBT youth may be
pulled to the streets as “the road toward the realization of self”).
31 MOORE, supra note 11, at 6–7.
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ing issues are often interwoven into the lives of young people who
eventually experience homelessness.32 LGBTQ youth are not
spared these catalysts. However, lesbian and gay youth are more
likely than their heterosexual counterparts to actually leave when
confronted with these issues.33 Additionally, LGBTQ youth are dis-
proportionately represented among homeless youth because of
family rejection of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or
gender identity.
Though perhaps antithetical to the social understanding of
the parent-child relationship, “parental love is not necessarily
enduring.”34 Parents can and do reject their children.35 Family re-
jection denotes the negative, adverse, punitive, and traumatic reac-
tions families have toward their child’s actual or perceived LGBTQ
status.36 Family rejection can include name-calling, blaming the
child for being LGBTQ, forcing the child to keep their orientation
or identity a secret, physical violence, isolation from friends and
family, denying LGBTQ-related care and services, and controlling
dress and behavior for gender appropriateness.37 Family rejection
elevates mental and physical health risks for LGBTQ children.38
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that
approximately 26% of LGBTQ homeless youth were forced to leave
32 See Ilse Nehring, “Throwaway Rights”: Empowering a Forgotten Minority, 18 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 767, 770 (1997).
33 See Bryan N. Cochran et al., Challenges Faced by Homeless Sexual Minorities: Compari-
son of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Homeless Adolescents with Their Heterosexual
Counterparts, 92 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 773, 774 (2002), available at http://ajph.
aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.92.5.773. This study was designed to
“identify the risks faced by GLBT youth and to determine whether these risks tran-
scend those of their heterosexual counterparts,” id. at 773, but did not differentiate
between gender non-conforming and gender-conforming or cis-gendered homeless
youth, indicating that the authors may have conflated the risks faced by gender non-
conforming youth with risks faced by youth with a non-heterosexual sexual orienta-
tion. Most data was based on “self-reporting” and most youth identified as bisexual. Id.
at 776. Thus, the results may not necessarily extend to youth who exclusively identify
as gay, lesbian, or transgender.
34 Nehring, supra note 32, at 769.
35 MOORE, supra note 11, at 7; see also N.Y.C. LGBTQ HOMELESS YOUTH REPORT,
supra note 8, at 17–18 (stating that parents with religious attitudes that condemn ho-
mosexuality and gender non-conformity may be likely to reject their child).
36 Caitlin Ryan, et al., Family Rejection as a Predictor of Negative Health Outcomes in
White and Latino Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Young Adults, PEDIATRICS 2009 at 346, 350,
available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/123/1/346.full.pdf+html.
37 RYAN, supra note 3, at 5.
38 See id.; see also Carl Siciliano, A Call to Cardinal Dolan to Stop Endangering LGBT
Youth: An Open Letter, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 20, 2012, available at http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/carl-siciliano/cardinal-dolan-lgbt-youth_b_1363153.html (reporting
that youth who are rejected by their families are “eight and a half times more likely to
be suicidal than those whose families accept them”).
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their families as a result of revealing their sexual orientation or
gender identity.39
Once homeless, a person is not simply without stable shelter.
Homelessness is accompanied by a loss of “community, routines,
possessions, privacy, and security.”40 There are social, mental, emo-
tional, and physical consequences of homelessness. LGB youth ex-
perience “greater vulnerability to physical and sexual victimization
. . . in comparison with homeless heterosexual adolescents.”41 Most
significant is the impact homelessness has on an individual’s ability
to survive. Generally, youth have not had the experience of living
independently before homelessness.42 Once homeless, youth have
to secure their basic needs and plan for the future when “their
capacity for rational thought and decision making is inconsistent
and still developing.”43 The ability to obtain even a minimum wage
or short-term job can be hindered by age, lack of housing, and lack
of identification, as well as minimal education and work experi-
ence.44 Unaccompanied youth face a high risk of living in absolute
poverty with no guaranteed route to financial stability. Between
120,000 and 240,000 LGBTQ youth are forced into “abject
destitution.”45
The financial consequences of homelessness can be somewhat
mitigated when youth have access to homeless services. In New
York City, homeless youth service providers help youth with hous-
ing, as well as assistance with services.46 Though informal arrange-
ments are generally set up between youth, unaccompanied youth
generally have few other options to obtain food, shelter, and cloth-
39 Turner, supra note 24, at 554 (citing PAUL GIBSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE 110, 112
(1989)).
40 ELLEN L. BASSUK & STEVEN M. FRIEDMAN, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NET-
WORK HOMELESSNESS AND EXTREME POVERTY WORKING GROUP, FACTS ON TRAUMA AND
HOMELESS CHILDREN 1 (2005), available at  http://www.nctsnet.org/sites/default/
files/assets/pdfs/Facts_on_Trauma_and_Homeless_Children.pdf.
41 See Cochran, supra note 33, at 775 (LGB is used here because of the limited
scope of the study—only one person identified as transgender, while 84% identified
as bisexual).
42 NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES TO PREVENT AND
END YOUTH HOMELESSNESS: BRIEF NO. 1 2 (2006), available at http://www.endhome-
lessness.org/files/1058_file_youth_brief_one.pdf. But see RAY, supra note 6, at 20–21
(discussing how dysfunctional family relationships led many homeless youth to be-
come highly independent before eventually leaving the home).
43 NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, supra note 42, at 3.
44 Id. at 2.
45 Siciliano, supra note 38.
46 N.Y.C. LGBTQ HOMELESS YOUTH REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
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ing, among other necessities.47 Unfortunately, unaccompanied
youth do not have equal access opportunities to these services.
LGBTQ youths’ ability to access homeless services depends on
whether the service provider is providing safe services. Access can
be impeded by the issues homeless youth generally face in acces-
sing services,48 compounded by problems unique to LGBTQ youth,
such as a service provider’s blatant or subtle demonstrations of
homophobia, transphobia,49 racism, or discrimination based on
age, mental health and ability, and physical ability. For example,
transgender youth, particularly those of color, are prevented from
accessing services when their identification documents do not
match their gender presentation or expression, just as much as
they are by the well-documented harassment and physical assaults
they risk in shelters.50 If LGBTQ youth are prevented from acces-
sing safe services to obtain their basic needs, then these services are
not viable options for all youth.
When financial instability and hindered access to services pre-
vent youth from obtaining their basic needs, alternative, and dan-
gerous, survival strategies are the last option.51 Youth may begin
participating in the “street economy,” which includes sex work, sell-
ing drugs, panhandling, shoplifting, mugging, and selling stolen
goods.52 As one homeless youth reported: “[Y]ou have to make a
living somehow. And if you really truly believe that you can’t do it
in a legal fashion, then you’ll do anything you have to do in order
to make money.”53 Providers working with LGBTQ youth substanti-
ate findings that LGBTQ youth face an increased risk of engaging
in survival sex.54
47 NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at 2.
48 Id. (“Few homeless youth are housed in emergency shelters as a result of lack of
shelter beds for youth, shelter admission policies, and a preference for greater
autonomy.”).
49 RAY, supra note 6, at 5; LAMBDA LEGAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
50 N.Y.C. LGBTQ HOMELESS YOUTH REPORT, supra note 8, at 16; see also RAY, supra
note 6, at 59.
51 Marya Viorst Gwadz et al., The Initiation of Homeless Youth into the Street Economy,
32 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 357, 358–59 (2009) (examining the survival strategies of home-
less youth and their initiation into the street economy).
52 Id. at 358. Homeless youth begin participating in the street economy for several
reasons, including obstacles to legal employment, the perceived benefits of the street
economic activities, immediate economic need, as well as feeling rejected or excluded
by society at large. Youth who were studied identified the street economy as normative
and the formal economy as foreign, which the researchers believe to be another in-
hibitor to stable and formal employment.
53 Id. at 367.
54 Petition from The Ali Forney Center et al. to Governor Cuomo, the New York State Legisla-
ture, and Mayor Bloomberg, THE ALEY FORNEY CTR., available at http://www.aliforney
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II. THE PARENTAL DUTY TO SUPPORT THE CHILD
“Wherever I look, I see signs of the commandment to honor one’s parents
and nowhere of a commandment that calls for the respect of a child.”55
At English common law, the duty to support the child was a
“principle of natural law.”56  Children were entitled only to that
which they received by their parents’ grace, and could not enforce
this moral duty.57 Seventeen-year-old Frieda Huke’s unsuccessful
action against her father, William, for maintenance and support,
exemplifies the use of this common law principle by American
courts.58 In 1890, William, a wealthy business owner in St. Louis,
forced Frieda out of his home without money or any provision for
her care. She was left impoverished, with no means of survival. Due
to her “youth, sex and lack of education and experience,” she was
unable to secure food and shelter, except that which she received
through charity.59 Frieda tried to enforce her “right to a just, ade-
quate and suitable provision for her wants in the premises” against
her father.60 The St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, held that
such an action could not be sustained because, at common law, the
duty to provide for the maintenance of a child was left “to the natu-
ral feelings of the parents,” and was therefore unenforceable in an
action by a child.61 Courts rarely diverted from this common law
center.org/?fuseaction=cms.page&id=1014 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013); see also
Siciliano, supra note 38; Laura A. Hughes, Youth Homelessness Moves Forward as a Major
LGBTQ Issue, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2013), available at http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/laura-a-hughes/homeless-lgbtyouth_b_1333732; JAIME M. GRANT, ET
AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINA-
TION SURVEY 3, 7 (table) (2011), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_
and_research/ntds. Of the transgender and gender non-conforming respondents to
the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, 16% reported that they had been
compelled to work in the underground economy for income (which includes sex
work), and of those who had been rejected by their families, 19% were engaged in sex
work.
55 ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING AND
THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 263  (Hildegarde Hannum trans., Sunkhamp Verlag 1st ed.
1980) (2003).
56 Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punish-
ment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1133 (1999) (citing WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 435 (1898)); JOANNA L.
GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH
CENTURY AMERICA 287 (2011) (discussing how the financial obligation to support ille-
gitimate children has been enforced in America through “bastardy laws” since the early
17th century).
57 Nehring, supra note 32, at 778 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 447).
58 Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1891).
59 Id. at 311.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 315.
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principle and then only if there was a specific law mandating such
enforcement62 or a contract with the parent authorizing such
enforcement.63
Today, in New York, parents have a legal duty to financially
support their child.64 This duty is considered “one of the oldest
and firmest pillars of New York family law.”65 Pursuant to a court
order or valid agreement between the parties, parents with suffi-
cient means must pay a reasonable and fair sum for the care, main-
tenance, and education of any un-emancipated child under 21
years of age.66 The amount to be paid is determined by the court.67
Support payments provide for the child’s necessary “shelter, food,
clothing, care, medical attention, expenses of confinement, the ex-
pense of education, payment of funeral expenses, and other
proper and reasonable expenses.”68 Although child support is typi-
cally understood in the context of a divorce,69 the obligation is not
from non-custodial parent to the custodial parent, but from the
parent to the child.70 This is important because child support obli-
gations can be enforced whether the parents’ relationship is intact,
or if the parents are separated, or even if the parents never main-
tained a relationship.71
There are important nuances associated with this duty. First,
unless an agreement expressly stating otherwise is made, the par-
ent is only liable until the child turns 21.72 Second, parents are
only liable for a reasonable and fair sum.73 To determine the sum,
courts will consider the child’s reasonable needs, the parent’s abil-
ity to pay, and how the standardized child support guidelines ap-
62 Id. at 313 (“[I]f any popish parent should refuse to allow his Protestant child a
fitting maintenance, with a view to compel him to change his religion, the lord chan-
cellor should, by order of the court, constrain him to do what is just and reasonable
. . . . [I]f Jewish parents should refuse to allow their Protestant children a fitting
maintenance, suitable to the fortune of the parents, the lord chancellor, on com-
plaint, might make such order as he should see proper.”).
63 Nehring, supra note 32, at 778 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 420
nn.7–9).
64 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 2013).
65 11 ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, WEST’S NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES, NEW YORK LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 16:1 (2d ed. 2011).
66 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(a)-(2).
67 Id. § 413(1)(a).
68 Id. § 416.
69 Nehring, supra note 32, at 780.
70 Id.
71 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:1.
72 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413; see also Hirsch v. Hirsch, 142 A.D.2d 138, 140 (2d Dep’t
1988).
73 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(a).
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ply.74 Third, numerous entities can enforce the duty. These
include the custodial parent,75 a third party,76 or a social services
agency.77 New York allows youth to bring independent action
against a parent for support.78 When a custodial parent or third
party cannot or will not bring an action to enforce the parental
duty of support, a child can bring an independent enforcement
action.79
To bring an action against their parent for support, the youth
must be un-emancipated.80 Emancipation denotes the legal adult-
hood of a young person, where there is a “surrender and renuncia-
tion of the correlative rights and duties concerning the care,
custody, and earnings of a child.”81 Generally, emancipation results
when the child reaches the age of majority, marries, or joins the
armed forces.82 Additionally, a court can emancipate a minor that
is of a minimum age, lives apart from her parents, handles her own
affairs, and can support herself financially.83
When the court deems a child emancipated, the parental duty
to support the child terminates.84 The child’s previous dependency
on a parent is not a determinative factor in finding that there is a
continuing obligation of support.85 This is in stark contrast to a
divorce action, where courts may look at the dependency of one
spouse on the other during the marriage to justify continued sup-
port.86 Importantly, the duty of support extends in special situa-
74 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(f) (McKinney 2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(1)(f); Comm’r of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Wandel v. Segarra, 78 N.Y.2d 220, 226
(1991). The Guidelines provide the courts with a method for calculating payment for
the basic needs of the child, such as shelter, food, and clothing, and the resulting
payment can be modified to include “add-ons” such as health care, child-care, and
educational expenses. 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:12.
75 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51. Though traditionally the father was only
chargeable for support, in 1979 the Supreme Court of the United States held that
support laws could no longer discriminate on the basis of the gender of the parent.
See generally Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281–82 (1979).
76 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 1013 (2012).
77 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 235.
78 Wakefield v. Wakefield, 84 A.D.3d 1256 (2d Dep’t. 2011) (ruling that 18-year-
old could maintain independent action against mother for child support).
79 Id.
80 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(b)(2).
81 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (9th ed. 2010) (definition for “emancipation”).
82 45 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 576 (2012); 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations
§ 907 (2012).
83 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 907; JULIANELLE, supra note 21, at 63–73 (dis-
cussing state law on emancipation).
84 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:50. Emancipation may be reversible.
85 Nehring, supra note 32, at 800.
86 Id.
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tions, such as where the young person receives public assistance.87
The duty is prolonged to protect society’s resources.88
In 1979, the New York Court of Appeals established “construc-
tive emancipation,” as a parental defense to a child support en-
forcement action.89 The Court held that when a “minor of
employable age and in full possession of her faculties, voluntarily
and without cause, abandons the parent’s home against the will of
the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, she
forfeits her right to demand support.”90 Constructive emancipation
is a limited defense.91 The party asserting emancipation bears the
burden of proof.92 The court will only relieve parents of their duty
to support “under extreme circumstances,” where the actions and
behavior of the child toward the parent have been egregious.93
This is in part because courts are cognizant of the child’s emo-
tional instability and immaturity, and are very hesitant to penalize a
youth by withholding necessary support.94 Additionally, courts are
cautious in burdening taxpayers with child support.95 However,
courts are also hesitant to unfairly burden the parent with under-
writing the lifestyle the child has chosen against the parent’s rea-
sonable wishes.96
Whether the child has been constructively emancipated de-
87 46 N.Y. JUR. 2d Domestic Relations § 912.
88 Id. § 907.
89 Id. Constructive emancipation is also called “emancipation by conduct,” Wis-
selman & Talassazan, infra note 93, at 1, or the “abandoned parent doctrine.” 11
SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51. Cases on constructive emancipation are generally
set in the context of a post-divorce family, where one parent is using constructive
emancipation as a defense to terminate their duty of support.
90 Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 192 (1971).
91 Jerome A. Wisselman, & Eyal Talassazan, Constructive Emancipation: Conduct of the
Child Can Lead to a Termination of Support—But Only Rarely, N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY 1
(Aug. 2008), available at http://www.lawjaw.com/documents/Aug08NYFam.pdf.
Courts have also made constructive emancipation procedurally difficult to establish.
Id. at 8. For instance, if the non-custodial parent is seeking to terminate their duty of
support to the child, they will have to follow a process that includes several petitions.
Id. These petitions include an order for visitation so as to establish evidence that the
child refuses to see the parent or maintain contact with the parent. Id.
92 46 N.Y. JUR. 2d Domestic Relations § 907.
93 Wisselman & Talassazan, supra note 91, at 8; 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65,
§ 16:51. Egregious behavior toward the parent may be found in a case like Donnelly v.
Donnelly, 14 A.D.3d 811 (3d Dep’t 2005) (holding that a mother no longer had a duty
to support her son because he violently abused her, stole from her, refused to attend
school, abused alcohol and drugs, was arrested, barricaded his room, and sequestered
his girlfriend in his room for days).
94 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Parker v. Stage, 43 N.Y.2d 128, 134 (1977).
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pends on the particular circumstances of each case.97 The court
will only undertake the constructive emancipation analysis after an
initial inquiry into the age and capacity of the child.98 One legal
scholar has provided a three-part test for constructive emancipa-
tion in New York.99 First, the court will look at the circumstances
surrounding the child’s alleged abandonment. Constructive eman-
cipation will only apply when the child has left the home volunta-
rily for the purpose of avoiding parental authority.100 Voluntary
abandonment can be established where the child had a choice and
the abandonment was “against the will of the parent.”101 A child
running away from home can be highly probative of voluntary
abandonment, while a parent instructing the child to leave the
home or preventing them from returning home is not.102 The
child must also abandon the home for the purpose of escaping
parental control, custody, and care. The duty of support does not
generally terminate simply because the child was “at odds with her
parents or had disobeyed their instructions.”103 Findings of volun-
tariness or an intent to escape parental control are probative of
constructive emancipation, but not conclusive.104
Second, the court will look at the parental actions related to
the abandonment. The court may find constructive emancipation
when the child lacked good cause for leaving the home because
the parent was reasonably exercising their right to “control,
custody, and care.”105 The duty of support has been cast as recipro-
cal.106 In return for support, the parent could “establish and im-
97 See Wisselman & Talassazan, supra note 91, at 8.
98 Id. at 1. See also Hiross v. Hiross, 224 A.D.2d 662, 662–63 (2d Dep’t 1996) (deter-
mining that son could not have abandoned his father as a matter of law because the
son was only 14 years old); 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51 (constructive eman-
cipation cases generally deal with youth close to or over the age of 18).
99 Nehring, supra note 32, at 795–96.
100 Id.
101 Wisselman & Talassazan, supra note 91, at 1.
102 See Ontario Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Gail K., 269 A.D.2d 847 (4th Dep’t 2000)
(relieving mother of child support liability where child refused to obey her lawful
directives, ran away from home, assaulted police officer, called mother vile names,
and was “totally out of control”). But see Drago v. Drago, 138 A.D.2d 704, 706 (2d
Dep’t 1988) (finding father liable for support when he refused to take in his daugh-
ter, insisting instead that she attend boarding school or join the military); Alice C. v.
Bernard G.C., 193 A.D.2d 97, 108 (2d Dep’t 1993) (finding father liable for child
support because the son was not found to have “abandoned” the home against his
father’s will when his father told him during an argument that if he left the house
then, he should not return home).
103 Wisselman & Talassazan, supra note 91.
104 Nehring, supra note 32, at 795–96.
105 Id.
106 Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 193 (1971).
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pose reasonable regulations for his child.”107 The parent could use
“the child unjustifiably withdraw[ing] from parental control and
supervision” to establish emancipation.108 If emancipated, the
child forfeits their right to support while the parent loses the right
to “custody, control, services, and earnings of such child.”109 The
court is considering whether, from the objective perspective of a
reasonably prudent parent, the parent made reasonable regula-
tions for the child.110 Reasonable regulations include a father re-
quiring his daughter, from the age of 14 to 17, to leave the
bedroom door open when she had boys over.111 The child’s right
to support is severed if the parent neither abused nor made unrea-
sonable demands but the child wanted to live somewhere else
against the wishes of her parents.112
If the youth had good cause to leave or had the approval of
the parent, constructive emancipation is not applicable.113 There is
no abandonment when the child is reluctant to see the parent for
good cause.114 Alternatively, the parent may be responsible for the
child’s alleged abandonment by causing a breakdown in the rela-
tionship with the child.115 For instance, a father was still liable for
support when he made very little effort to fix the relationship with
his child after a violent fight.116 Courts have suggested that if the
child were abandoned or abused by the parent, the parent would
continue to be liable for support.117 The New York Court of Ap-
peals has suggested that a showing that a father “actively drove [his
daughter] from her home or encouraged her to leave in order to
107 Id.
108 Wisselman & Talassazan, supra note 91, at 1.
109 Boley v. Knowles, 905 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. 1995) (citing Mennemeyer v. Hart,
221 S.W.2d 960, 962 (1949)). See also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 37 (2013).
110 Nehring, supra note 32, at 794–95.
111 Chambers v. Chambers, 742 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726–27 (3d Dep’t 2002).
112 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D Domestic Relations § 912 (2013).
113 Monroe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc’y. Serv. ex rel San Filippo v. San Filippo, 178 A.D.2d
1011, 1012 (4th Dep’t 1991); 45 N.Y. Jur. 2d Domestic Relations § 524 (2012). See also G.
Stephen Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing Parents in Tort
for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689, 711 (2000) (stating that a
child may also be able to bring a tort action against the parent for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and receive compensation or damages).
114 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51; Radin v. Radin, 209 A.D.2d at 396 (2d
Dep’t 1994) (no abandonment when father claimed daughter didn’t return phone
calls).
115 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51.
116 Kordes v. Kordes, 70 A.D.3d 782, 783 (2d Dep’t 2010) (finding that daughter
was not constructively emancipated where father was most likely the cause of the
alienation).
117 See, e.g., Parker v. Stage, 43 N.Y.2d 128, 134 (1977).
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have the public assume his obligation of support” would render a
different ruling.118
Finally, the court will look to see whether the child has tried to
return home. If the child has made a request to return home and
the parents have refused, the court is less likely to find that the
child is emancipated.119 This factor rests on the idea that the right
to support is reciprocal with the right to custody and control.
Courts ask this question in cases where it may be possible for the
child to return home as a condition of the support.120 However,
courts recognize that returning home to the parent is not possible
in every situation. Where the court determines that the family ties
have been irreparably severed, they will not give much weight to
this inquiry.121
III. A NEW LEGAL STRATEGY FOR UNACCOMPANIED
LGBTQ YOUTH
“Sometimes like when you don’t have nowhere to go. I’m about to cry
right now. You need the money to eat you know. You might want to
make money to stay in a hotel in the night because you haven’t slept in so
long. You know little things like that. You need to buy a new pair of
underwear, a new pair of socks, or something because you don’t want to
be stinking, you know. It’s really hard.”122
Youth who have been forced out of their homes due to their
sexual orientation or gender identity could enforce the duty to pay
child support against their parents. Though the court would have
to look at the particular circumstances in each case, generally
LGBTQ unaccompanied youth could survive the constructive
emancipation defense if it is put forth by the parent. When it is
established that the youth is owed support, the court can deter-
mine the fair and reasonable sum that parents should pay for their
child’s basic needs, including food, shelter, and clothing. If uti-
lized, this recommendation would most likely be limited to specific
situations.
A. Unaccompanied LGBTQ Youth Enforcing the Parental Duty of
Support
When an unaccompanied youth brings an action to enforce
118 Id.
119 Nehring, supra note 32, at 795–96.
120 Drago v. Drago, 138 A.D.2d 704, 706 (2d Dep’t, 1988).
121 Id.
122 Gwadz et al., supra note 51, at 371 (quoting Jonella, age 19).
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the parental duty of support, the parent may claim constructive
emancipation to escape liability. LGBTQ youth may be experienc-
ing homelessness for a variety of reasons. This section will focus on
applying the duty of support and the constructive emancipation
defense to situations where LGBTQ youth have been forced out of
the home and where they have run away from the home.
In cases where a youth, younger than 21, has been rejected by
their family for coming out as LGBTQ and is subsequently forced
out of the home, the parental duty to financially support the child
remains intact and enforceable. The constructive emancipation de-
fense is not applicable in these cases. In dicta, it has been said that
if the parent instructed the child to leave the home or refused to
take them back as they were currently identifying, courts cannot
find voluntary abandonment for the purpose of escaping parental
control.123 For example, the New York Court of Appeals has sug-
gested that where there is evidence that the parent drove the child
from the home or encouraged the child to get public assistance to
avoid supporting the child, the constructive emancipation defense
could not be met.124
For LGBTQ youth who have run away from home, the
constructive emancipation defense may prove more difficult to
overcome. Running away has been found to be probative of volun-
tariness.125 However, courts will balance the child’s act of running
away with whether or not it was against the wishes of the parent.126 For
instance, a father could prove that the child voluntarily abandoned
the home when she ran away and that this was against his wishes
because he went to look for her each night.127 For LGBTQ youth,
an act of running away will be probative of voluntary abandon-
123 See Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 193–94 (1971) (“We do not have before us the
case of a father who casts his helpless daughter upon the world, forcing her to fend
for herself.”)
124 See Parker v. Stage, 43 N.Y.2d 128, 134 (1977). It should be noted that the court
did not specifically rule on the hypothetical of these facts.
125 See Ontario Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Gail K., 269 A.D.2d, 847, 847–48 (4th
Dep’t 2000) (relieving a mother of her obligation to support her 16-year-old son when
she established, among other infractions, that he repeatedly ran away from home);
Parker, 43 N.Y.2d at 134–35 (terminating a father’s duty to support his child after he
submitted evidence that the daughter ran away from his home and, upon return,
continued to disappear for long periods of time).
126 Wisselman & Talassazan, supra note 91, at 1; Roe, 29 N.Y.2d at 189 (point made
by counsel rather than the court).
127 Parker, 43 N.Y.2d at 131(indicating that father wanted his daughter to return
home and utilized the police to get her safely home); see also Orange Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Serv. ex rel Clavijo v. Clavijo, 172 Misc. 2d 87, 89 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1997) (indicating
that the parents set a curfew time for their son, and when the son did not come home
on time, the father would go search for him).
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ment. In order to negate the value of this act, they will have to
argue either that their act was aligned with the wishes of their par-
ent or that their act was not actually voluntary. They could establish
that their abandonment of the home was not against the wishes of
the parent if the parent had previously told them to leave. This
could also be established if there was evidence that the parents did
not look for the child after he ran away. If, alternatively, the child
were to argue that their act was not actually voluntary, the court’s
analysis would bleed the inquiry into the purpose of the child’s
abandonment.
The court will inquire into the child’s reason for abandoning
the family home to determine whether it was for the purpose of
avoiding parental “control.”128 As a generalization, LGBTQ youth
who run away from home after experiencing family rejection of
their sexual orientation or gender identity, leave to avoid the au-
thority of their parents. For example, a transgender youth may
leave because the parent forces them to dress and behave in ways
that do not conform to their gender identity. In these cases, where
the young person leaves to escape an intolerable living environ-
ment, courts will have to consider whether the parent’s rules were
reasonable. The youth could argue that rules arising out of the par-
ent’s rejection of the youth’s sexual orientation or gender identity
are unreasonable because they amount to abuse, neglect, or
maltreatment.
Regulations that amount to abuse, neglect, maltreatment, and
abandonment of the child are unreasonable.129 The New York City
Administration for Children’s Services has issued a policy recogniz-
ing the connection between family rejection and parental behav-
iors that impact a child’s safety or puts them at risk.130 The policy
states that a child’s sexual orientation and/or gender identity does
not excuse a parent’s abuse or neglect.131 It permits child protec-
tive services to investigate the beliefs and values of the parents
when it is suspected that family rejection of the child’s sexual ori-
128 See Nehring, supra note 32, at 808.
129 Roe, 29 N.Y.2d at 193 (“It is the natural right, as well as the legal duty, of a parent
to care for, control and protect his child from potential harm, whatever the source
and absent a clear showing of misfeasance, abuse or neglect, courts should not inter-
fere with that delicate responsibility.”).
130 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., PROMOTING A SAFE AND RESPECTFUL
ENVIRONMENT FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER AND QUESTIONING (LGBTQ)
YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES INVOLVED IN THE CHILD WELFARE, DETENTION, AND JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, POLICY # 2012/01, at 17–18, 19 (2012), available at http://www.
nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/lgbtq/LGBTQ_Policy.pdf.
131 Id. at 7.
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entation and/or gender identity is directly related to the allega-
tions of abuse or neglect.132 Family rejection is related to child
abuse or neglect when parents behave adversely or punitively to-
ward the child for disclosing their LGBTQ identity.133 Behaviors
indicating rejection of the child’s sexual orientation or gender
identity are related to allegations of abuse or neglect when parents
behave adversely or punitively toward their child for disclosing
their LGBTQ identity.134 The parental duty to support a child is
not severed when the child is no longer living at the home because
of abuse and neglect. This is particularly clear where a social ser-
vices agency removes the child from the home for abuse or neglect,
provides the child with necessary services, and then sues the parent
for reimbursement.135
A determination about whether the parental regulations were
reasonable will depend on the specific circumstances of the case.
For instance, a court would likely find that physical abuse of the
child would constitute an unreasonable exercise of parental au-
thority. The analysis becomes more complicated if a child aban-
doned the home because the parent regulated their association
with other LGBTQ youth. New York courts have held that control-
ling a child’s association with friends under certain circumstances
is reasonable. A father’s prohibition against his teenage daughter
from having boys in her room with the door closed was reasona-
ble.136 The Second Department has implied that a mother’s rule
against her daughter hanging out with her friends during all hours
of the night was considered reasonable.137 If a child can establish
that the parent controlled her association with other LGBTQ
friends at all times or isolated her from her friends under all cir-
cumstances, this could amount to an unreasonable exercise of au-
thority over the child. If unreasonable demands were placed on the
child, the court is likely to find good cause for abandoning the
home.
The child retains their right to support if they have left for
good cause or the parent was the cause of the breakdown of the
132 Id. at 6.
133 Id. at 6–7 (explaining that among the factors a child protective specialist is di-
rected to consider are the following applicable safety factors: verbal violence; ostraciz-
ing or belittling the child for their status; and/ or controlling the child’s association
with friends, clothing choices, and grooming practices).
134 Id.
135 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 235, 415 (McKinney 2012).
136 Chambers v. Chambers, 295 A.D.2d 654, 655 (3d Dep’t 2002).
137 Comm’r of Soc. Servs. v. Jones-Gamble, 227 A.D.2d 618 (2d Dep’t 1996).
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relationship.138 The court will also consider whether the child has
requested to return to the parental home.139 For LGBTQ youth
who have been forced out of the home because of sexual orienta-
tion and/or gender identity, an inquiry into whether they re-
quested to return home is unlikely to become determinative. New
York courts have accepted that if the parental home is not open for
return, there is no injustice to the parent in continuing to support
the child elsewhere.140
If the court finds that the parent of an LGBTQ unaccompa-
nied youth continues to be responsible for the child’s support,
then the court will determine the amount of child support owed to
the child. Though the ideal would be to have the parents maintain
the child at the lifestyle to which they were accustomed, the child
should be awarded enough for basic necessities.141 Child support,
in this context, should be capped at a percentage that adequately
provides for the child’s basic needs in the particular jurisdiction.
For instance, a specific amount could be determined as the reason-
able and fair sum that could provide the child with food, shelter,
and clothing. Courts would then adjust the payments as per the
parents’ financial situation, the child’s financial situation, as well as
any add-on expenses such as healthcare and educational expenses.
Additionally, although the continued duty of support rests on the
precept that a parent will have some continued custody and con-
trol over their child, this is not upheld in all cases. Courts do not
have to include a reciprocal right to care, custody, and control in
the order for continuation of support.142 This is especially impor-
tant for LGBTQ youth who may not be willing to go to court to
enforce their right to support by the parent if they have to recon-
cile or move back in with the parent.
B. Public Policy Reasons for Enforcing the Duty of Support
The reason for hesitancy with allowing the child to enforce the
parental duty of support in court is that it limits parental authority
and requires parents to “share power with the children.”143 How-
138 Monroe Cnty Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. San Filippo v. San Filippo, 178 A.D.2d
1011, 1012 (4th Dep’t 1991) (citing Henry v. Boyd, 99 A.D.2d 382 (4th Dep’t 1984)).
139 See Nehring, supra note 32, at 795–96.
140 See Drago v. Drago, 138 A.D.2d 704, 707 (2d Dep’t 1988).
141 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 413, 416 (McKinney 2012); Dutchess Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. ex rel. Day v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149, 151 (2001).
142 See, e.g., Drago v. Drago, 138 A.D.2d 704, 707 (2d Dep’t 1988).
143 Nehring, supra note 32, at 809 (quoting Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Break-
ing Connections Between Parents’ Duty to Support and Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR.
L. REV. 689 (1990)).
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ever, the state has determined that there are legitimate reasons for
intervening in the parent-child relationship. The proposal ex-
plored in this article is in line with two important goals of state
intervention in the family relationship: 1) protecting youth by pro-
viding support to allow them to grow into “good” citizens, and 2)
to the extent possible, making reasonable efforts to reunify the
family.
First, allowing a child who has been forced out of the home by
the parent to seek enforcement of the parental duty to support is
in line with the state’s goal of protecting youth so that they become
good citizens. When the state intervenes in child abuse-and-neglect
cases, the underlying understanding is that “well-cared-for children
can grow into autonomous adults.”144 There is a similar under-
standing when the state provides services for homeless and run-
away youth.145 New York’s Department of Youth and Community
Development offers a number of services for homeless and run-
away youth under the federal Runaway and Homeless Youth Act,146
including street outreach, emergency shelter services, crisis inter-
vention, and transitional living programs. These services supply
youth with their basic necessities and help them develop skills to
transition into adulthood, such as job skill development and inde-
pendent living skills.
In the event that some or all of the homeless services options
are not available, or their accessibility changes with time, youth
should not be left without financial support. Enforcing the duty of
support against parents responsible for homeless unaccompanied
youth broadens the options for youth’s economic independence.
This legal strategy helps youth secure a financial cushion to assist
them with their basic needs as they become self-sufficient, “good”
citizens for society.
Second, state intervention into family relationships includes a
commitment to make all reasonable efforts to help reunify the fam-
ily. Asking parents to financially support the youth they have
forced out of their home could incentivize parents to rethink their
relationship to their child. Families can be taught the impact that
their words and actions have on their child’s well-being and ulti-
mate survival.147 If they learn the effects of family rejection, fami-
144 Anne L. Alstott, What Does a Fair Society Owe Children—and Their Parents?, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1942 (2004).
145 See The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5701(3), (5) (2012).
146 See generally Runaway Homeless Youth, N.Y.C DEP’T OF YOUTH & CMTY. DEV., http:/
/www.nyc.gov/html/dycd/html/runaway/runaway.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
147 For information on an organization working with these issues, see THE FAMILY
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lies may begin to support their children.148 By pulling parents into
court, child support enforcement may force families to consider
the deleterious effects of rejection on the well-being of their child,
develop awareness about sexual orientation and/or gender identity
issues, and change the parents’ behavior toward their child. The
argument that intra-family litigation causes further breakdown in
the family does not apply when the matter at hand is enforcing
child support for basic necessities. The potential for reunification
is evinced by the arguments parents must put forth as they predict-
ably assert the right to terminate support. In putting forth the con-
structive emancipation defense, the parent is arguing that they
want to have care, custody, and control of the child—or, at a mini-
mum, visitation or contact if they are made to pay child support.
The parent will further have to establish that the child left against
their wishes. Bringing parties into the courtroom to discuss the con-
tinuation of the parental duty to support can shift perspectives.
The parent will be exposed to how their rejection has affected their
child’s survival, and they will also reflect on their relationship with
the child.
IV. CRITIQUES
“Issues of family rights, obligations, responsibilities, and accountability
should be dealt with, but only after the young person is in a safe, secure
environment.”149
Addressing the essential critiques of this proposal is necessary
to negate the hesitancy courts feel in allowing youth to enforce the
duty of support.150 This section provides counterarguments to four
major critiques expected to arise against this proposal. First, youth
may be unwilling to enforce the duty of support against their par-
ents. Second, youth should not be able to enforce the duty to sup-
port. Third, parents will not be able to pay the support payments.
Finally, by allowing the child to enforce the duty of support against
the parent, the state is violating the parent’s fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their child.
ACCEPTANCE PROJECT, http://familyproject.sfsu.edu (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). The
Family Acceptance Project is a multiyear research, intervention, and training initiative
on LGBT youth and their families and caregivers carried out at the Ce´sar E. Cha´vez
Institute at San Francisco State University.
148 See id.
149  Colby, supra note 16, at 8.
150 See Nehring, supra note 32, at 809.
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A. Youth Will Be Unwilling to Enforce the Parental Duty to Support
Young people may be unwilling to enforce the duty of support
against their parents, particularly when they have left the home be-
cause of family rejection of their sexual orientation and/or gender
identity. This argument stems from the understanding that if youth
have been thrown out of the home or abused, they tend to be “less
than enthusiastic about bringing their families back into the pro-
cess.”151 For this reason, advocates that work on issues of LGBTQ
youth homelessness focus more on serving the immediate needs of
youth without involving the family.152 Additionally, this critique in-
volves the valid uncertainty of forcing youth to interact with a legal
system that has often been hostile to LGBTQ people.
This proposal, however, is part of an effort to expand the op-
tions for economic stability in the lives of unaccompanied LGBTQ
youth. As such, it recognizes the varied experiences of youth.
Though it may not be an option for every child, it can open doors
for youth who are willing to utilize it to receive financial support in
this way. The parental duty to support the child is a mandatory
one, but it will require the willingness of the child to seek enforce-
ment. Furthermore, though some youth will rightfully be hesitant
to interact with the court system, others may prefer it to interaction
with state assistance programs. Advocating for both options of eco-
nomic stability allows youth to seek out the method of financial
support that is most suited to them. Finally, this option is not de-
signed to encompass all LGBTQ unaccompanied youth. Some
youth have actually emancipated and others want to be considered
emancipated. In these cases, continued financial support would
not be an option because their right to it has been severed.
B. Youth Should Not Be Able to Enforce the Duty to Support
The second critique is that youth should not be able to en-
force the duty to support. This argument comes in three different
versions. It may be argued simply that young people should not be
151 Theresa Nolan & Jennifer Gunnell, Bringing Families into the Fold When Serving
Homeless LGBT Youth, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2012, 5:42 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/theresa-nolan/homeless-gay-youth_b_1218151.html.
152 Id. (“Family rejection and its tragic consequences are hardly new problems. But
for many years, providers and advocates for these youth have, for many reasons, fo-
cused on the youth themselves, giving little attention to their families. Those who
work with LGBT youth must confront some basic realities: short-term stays, limited
resources, and reluctant clients make it difficult to make much headway in involving
families when the focus on basic needs and reducing the risks these youth are ex-
posed to on the streets is paramount.”).
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rewarded for “delinquent” behavior. Alternatively, it may be ar-
gued that parents shouldn’t have to support the runaway child be-
cause there are viable state sponsored mechanisms to provide the
child with financial assistance. Another version of this critique is
that youth are not mature enough to be awarded money.
The argument that young people should not be rewarded for
delinquent behavior is a viable one. This view focuses on runaway
youth who have undermined parental authority by running away.
This viewpoint demonstrates why some courts have accepted the
constructive emancipation defense and ordered the termination of
the duty of support. This argument, however, does not account for
the fact that youth, even if they have made the decision to run
away, may have nonetheless been forced out of the home. Further-
more, the act of running away can be done for the youth’s own
protection and safety.153 Allowing youth to enforce the parental
duty of support against a parent who has forced them out of the
home is not a reward for delinquent conduct, but a reward for sur-
viving and wanting to survive. There is a deeper argument that al-
lowing youth to receive financial support may entice youth to leave
for invalid reasons and try to enforce the parental duty of support.
However, this is addressed by court involvement in ordering and
enforcing the support. The court will determine whether the child
has been forced out of the home by the parent, and if so, will order
and enforce support.
It may also be argued that the youth should not pursue pay-
ment from the parents, but access the state assistance that is availa-
ble for them. Yet, as emphasized throughout this paper, not all
youth are eligible for state services or assistance.154 Young people
who have been forced out of the home or have run away rarely
have the documentation necessary for accessing state services.155
The ability of the state to prevent youth from accessing services
based on lack of documentation is evident in federal legislation
pertaining to homeless and unaccompanied youth. For instance,
the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act has incorporated
specific provisions mandating that states review and change their
policies concerning necessary documentation youth need for ac-
cessing public education.156 These provisions were incorporated
because homeless and unaccompanied youth were prevented from
153 See RAY, supra note 6, at 20–21.
154 See Nehring, supra note 32, at 804–05.
155 Gwadz et al., supra note 51, at 368–69.
156 See McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)
(1)(H) (2012).
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accessing public education for lack of necessary records. Trans-
gender youth have also had well-documented problems accessing
state assistance when the sex on their identification documents
fails to match their gender expression or presentation.157
Furthermore, in New York, a parent of sufficient means is obli-
gated to provide support for a child on public assistance.158 The
state will generally provide the assistance to the child and seek re-
imbursement from the parents. However, having the state act as an
intermediary instead of allowing the child to enforce the duty of
support directly against the parent places more obstacles in front
of the child. The child may or may not want to seek public assis-
tance, and may or may not be able to receive it.159 Additionally, the
burden should not fall on the state if there are people of means,
namely the parents, to provide for the child.
The view that unaccompanied youth are able to obtain em-
ployment stems from a societal misconception about employment
accessibility for homeless people in general. Obtaining employ-
ment is difficult for a housed person with access to hot water, food,
a bed, and clean clothing, and so it is much more difficult for
someone who does not even have those basic needs met. There are
significant barriers to homeless youth obtaining jobs in the formal
economy, including: the effects of homelessness itself (such as hun-
ger, fatigue, and an inability to stay clean), the lack of an address to
give to employers, educational limitations or lack of previous job
experience, mental health issues, race and ethnicity, sexual orien-
tation and transgender identity, and age.160 Even if youth could
become employed, these barriers could cause them to lose their
job.161 There are also barriers specific to actual or perceived
LGBTQ identity. For instance, male-to-female transgender youth
reported the highest levels of discrimination when attempting to
access employment.162 Still, youth should not be forced into em-
ployment, especially when they can attend school. In New York,
youth must attend school until they are 16 years old and can attend
until they are 21.163 Youth should be allowed to attend school with-
157 The Sylvia Rivera Law Project is an example of a transgender-specific service
provider that helps clients change their documentation because of the high demand
for such services. See generally THE SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, http://srlp.org/ (last
visited Apr. 17, 2013).
158 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 2012).
159 Nehring, supra note 32, at 804–05.
160 Gwadz, supra note 51, at 368.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 369.
163 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3202, 3205(1)(a) (McKinney 2012).
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out the interference of having to obtain full-time work in order to
attain their basic survival needs. Without permitting youth to en-
force the parental duty of support, “when the parent-child relation-
ship deteriorates, often the child shoulders the burden of financial
loss and economic deprivation.”164
Finally, this second critique encompasses the question of
whether young people could be paid directly. Generally, the custo-
dial parent or third party enforces the child support obligations
and is the one paid, though the money is owed to the child.165
Unaccompanied youth over the age of 18 are legally adults and
could be paid directly; as for unaccompanied youth under the age
of 18, the court could make an inquiry into the child’s age and
capacity to determine if the child could be paid directly.166  In ad-
dition, children are awarded money after court intervention in
other contexts. For instance, in jurisdictions where the parental im-
munity doctrine has been fully or partially abrogated, youth are
permitted to bring tort claims for emotional, physical, and sexual
abuse against their parents.167 Here, the money from the parental
duty of support could only be directed for necessities—namely
shelter, clothing, and food—and would be available in small
amounts paid regularly until the child reaches the age of 21. A
third-party payor could be enlisted to receive, pay, and track the
payments. For unaccompanied youth who are younger than 16, at-
tempting to enforce the parental duty of support directly may re-
sult in child welfare placement, as the state is responsible for these
youth.168 If the state could not reunify the child with the parents,
then they would be placed in care and the social services agency
would seek reimbursement from the parent.
164 Nehring, supra note 32, at 804–05.
165 Id. at 780.
166 Courts already inquire into the age and capacity of a young person when deter-
mining whether to allow the constructive emancipation defense. See Wisselman &
Talassazan, supra note 91, at 8. Cf. Hiross v. Hiross, 224 A.D.2d 662, 662–63 (2d Dep’t
1996); 11 SCHEINKMAN, supra note 65, § 16:51.
167 See G. Stephen Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing
Parents in Tort for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689, 711 (2000). See
also Benjamin Shmueli, Love and the Law, Children Against Mothers and Fathers: Or,
What’s Love Got to Do With It?, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 131, 147–54 (2010).
168 Under New York law, being under 18 triggers the responsibility of the state. Cf.
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(1) (McKinney 2012). There are major problems with this
possibility, as LGBTQ youth have extensively suffered in state child welfare and juve-
nile justice systems. See generally ROB WORONOFF ET AL., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.
& LAMBDA LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, OUT OF THE MARGINS: A REPORT ON REGIONAL
LISTENING FORUMS HIGHLIGHTING THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS-
GENDER AND QUESTIONING YOUTH IN CARE (2006), available at http://www.cwla.org/
programs/culture/outofthemargins.pdf.
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C. Parents Without Sufficient Means to Pay
Third, there is a general concern about child support enforce-
ment. As enforcement has become stricter, parents without the suf-
ficient means to provide support payments have been criminalized.
This may be more likely in situations where the child has been
thrown out or forced to run away from their home. Youth who are
experiencing homelessness are typically leaving a dysfunctional
and poverty-stricken family environment. Some youth have re-
ported being forced to leave the home because their parents were
not able to provide for their basic needs.
However, the parental duty to support the child, as statutorily
codified in New York, already requires the court to inquire into
whether the parents are of sufficient means or are able to earn the
sufficient means to provide for the child. Allowing youth to directly
enforce the parental duty of support would not change this re-
quirement. A court would still have to make a determination about
whether the parents are able to provide support for the child and if
so, what the reasonable and fair sum would be. If the parents are of
sufficient means, but refuse to pay, the court can withhold their
wages or ensure compliance with a contempt order.169
D. Allowing the Child to Enforce the Duty to Support Violates the
Federal Constitution
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
parents have a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, to the “care,
custody, and management of their child.”170 This interest does not
evaporate when the parent temporarily loses custody of the child to
the state.171 In New York, courts have held that this interest in care,
custody, and control is reciprocal to the duty to support the child.
This parental authority over the child has been upheld because
there are “pages of human experience that teach that parents gen-
erally do act in the child’s best interests,” even though some par-
ents may abuse or neglect children.172
However, this fundamental liberty interest is not without limit.
Parents cannot force their child from the home and argue that this
is an extension of their fundamental right to care, custody and con-
169 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2011).
170 Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982) (characterizing the right as
“freedom of personal choice in matters of family life”).
171 Id.
172 Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979).
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trol. The state is not “without constitutional control over parental
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental
health is jeopardized.”173 The state regularly uses parens patriae
power to protect children in cases of abuse and neglect. Further-
more, as discussed above, the state has the power to order and
enforce child support orders against a non-custodial parent. There-
fore, states can impose child support orders against parents who
have forced their children from the family home without violating
the parent’s right to care, custody, and control of the child.
CONCLUSION
“And while so many [LGBTQ homeless] youth have displayed great resil-
ience, wisdom, and independence in overcoming the obstacles they face,
basic survival—let alone sustained independence—is a day-to-day
challenge.”174
Options of support for unaccompanied youth have trans-
formed partly in recognition that specific subsets of this population
receive services. LGBTQ youth are one such subset. In response to
research studies and reports, and most importantly the voiced and
written experiences of LGBTQ youth experiencing homelessness,
practitioners and advocates have put forth numerous recommen-
dations to improve homeless youth services. This work continues
under the well-founded belief that bettering the services of an ex-
tremely vulnerable population will in turn make more services
available to all youth. As a supplement to these recommendations,
I suggest that LGBTQ unaccompanied youth advocates seriously
consider whether some of the young people they are serving could
benefit from enforcing the parental duty of support. This proposal
is part of an effort to expand the options for economic stability for
unaccompanied LGBTQ youth.  At the very least, this option
should be further explored by service providers and practitioners.
Exploring the ability of LGBTQ youth to enforce the parental
duty of support recognizes the extremely varied experiences that
unaccompanied youth have. Though it may not be an option for
every child, it can open doors for youth who are willing to utilize it
as a means of securing their basic needs. These youth deserve as
many avenues and resources to achieve economic stability and, in
turn, transition out of homelessness, as can be identified. They de-
serve more from their peers, service providers, policy-makers, and
advocates. But their parents legally owe it to them.
173 Id.
174 Hughes, supra note 7.
